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tion 5 Through 9 Of The Uniform Probate And The Revised Codes Of Montana: Principally The Execution,

ARTICLES
A COMPARISON OF ARTICLE II, PARTS 5 THROUGH 9 OF
THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE AND THE REVISED CODES
OF MONTANA:
PRINCIPALLY, THE EXECUTION, REVOCATION, AND
CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS
Lester R. Rusoff*
INTRODUCTION"
The draftsmen of the Uniform Probate Code did not invent new
procedures but adopted them from present practices of various jurisdictions. The Code does, however, represent, for Montana, a novel
approach to the execution and probate of wills and the administration
of estates. The U.P.C. is intended to replace the formality of the older
procedures with greater flexibility. The scope of this article is limited
to a segment of the U.P.C. and will deal with such subjects as the
requirements for execution of wills and the rules of construction.'
It is the purpose of this article to use these subjects to illustrate the
attitudes and goals of the draftsmen of the U.P.C.
The draftsmen appear to have had three main goals. The first
is to dispense with needless formalities. The concern here is with those
formalities which tend to prevent the probate of a will, even though it
obviously expresses the intent of the testator and does not demonstrate
evidence of fraud. To remedy this, the U.P.C. allows for greater liberality
in such things as the execution of wills and the admissibility of evidence
relating to the testator's intent.
The second goal is to supply authority that is commonly lacking
in both the statutory and case law of many states. An example is the
provision in the U.P.C. relating to facts of independent significance.
The U.P.C. also settles the applicability of anti-lapse statutes to class
gifts.
Finally, the third goal is to incorporate more modern attitudes into
the law. This goal is evidenced by the provisions relating to half-blood
relatives, implied exercise of powers of appointment, the use of interested
witnesses, and the renunciation of succession. The U.P.C. also removes
the distinction between bequests and devises and defines the term "devise" to apply to personal property as well as real property. 2
*Professor of Law, University of Montana. A.B. Harvard College, 1940; J.D.,
Harvard University, 1943; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1952.
1

The article deals with Parts 5 through 9 of Article II of the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
[hereinafter cited as U.P.C.]. This material is an outgrowth of a panel of lawyers
which was presented on June 22, 1973, at the annual meeting of the Montana Bar
Association.
'U.P.C. § 1-201.
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WHO MAY MAKE A WILL.

Revised Codes of Montana, 1947 [R.C.M.] equivalent:

91-101.

The provisions of the R.C.M. and the U.P.C. are similar, except
that the U.P.C. forecloses a question raised by the R.C.M. R.C.M. 91-101
requires a testator to be "over the age of eighteen years," thus raising
a question as to when a testator is "over" that age. U.P.C. 2-501 avoids
this question by providing that "Any person 18 or more years of age
who is of sound mind may make a will."

U.P.C. 2-502.

EXECUTION.

R.C.M. equivalent: 91-107.
U.P.C. 2-502 dispenses with several requirements of R.C.M. 91-107:
1.

R.C.M. 91-107 requires that a will be ".... subscribed at the end ......
U.P.C. 2-502 requires that a will be "signed" but does not require that it be "subscribed" or that it be "subscribed at the
end." Thus, under U.P.C. 2-502, the name of the testator, appearing anywhere in his will, can serve as his signature if he
intended it to do so. In this respect, U.P.C. 2-502 is comparable
to R.C.M. 91-108, which states the present requirements for
holographic wills.

2.

R.C.M. 91-107 requires that a testator's signature be made in the
presence of the attesting witnesses. U.P.C. 2-502 does not.
U.P.C. 2-502 does, however, require that the witnesses have
witnessed either the signing or the testator's acknowledgment.
Can one witness a signing unless the signature is, in fact, made
in his presence?

3.

R.C.M. 91-107 requires that a testator "declare" to the witnesses that
the instrument is his will. U.P.C. 2-502 does not. Under U.P.C.
2-502, the witnesses need not know that the instrument is a
will, if the testator asks them only to witness his signature or
his acknowledgment of his signature.
4. U.P.C. 2-502 does not require that the witnesses sign at the end
of the will.
5. U.P.C. 2-502 does not require that a testator have requested the
witnesses to sign. This should avoid litigation about a question
of fact as to whether a testator expressly or by acquiescence in
the act of another requested the witnesses to sign.
6. U.P.C. 2-502 does not require that witnesses sign in the presence of
a testator. This should eliminate litigation about whether witnesses signed in the testator's sight or in his "conscious presence." 3 It should tend to avoid the invalidity that is likely

1T, ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF WILLS, 341-343
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss1/1

(2d ed. 1953).
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to occur when a lawyer who drafted a will does not supervise
its execution.
U.P.C. 2-503.

HOLOGRAPHIC WILL.

R.C.M. equivalent:

91-108.

U.P.C. 2-503 dispenses with certain requirements of R.C.M. 91-108:
1.

U.P.C. 2-503 does not require that a holographic will be "entirely"
in the handwriting of the testator but only that the signature
and "material provisions" be in his handwriting. Previously,
attempted wills have been held invalid because the testator
intended to treat printed matter as part of his will. This has
occurred even though printing could have been ignored without affecting the substance of the provisions.'

2.

The U.P.C. does not require that a holographic will be dated. This
should avoid litigation as to whether a partial date, like "June
1973," is sufficient. 5 On the other hand, lack of a date may
increase the difficulty of dealing with alleged incapacity and
raise questions as to order of execution of several testamentary
documents. R.C.M. 91-107 does not require that a formal will
be dated, but presumably formal wills are usually dated."

U.P.C. 2-504.

SELF-PROVED WILL.

R.C.M. equivalent:

None.

This elective provision, if used, makes unnecessary the production
of witnesses when a will is being probated. Under U.P.C. 3-303, production of witnesses is unnecessary if a will is probated informally, so
the purpose of U.P.C. 2-504 is to make it possible to avoid producing
witnesses if a will is probated formally. U.P.C. 2-504 enables a testator
to avoid contest as to proper execution after he is dead, by permitting
re Noyes' Estate, 40 Mont. 190, 105 P. 1017 (1909) rejected an instrument offered
as a holographic will, because the figures ''190'' in the date were printed. For the
conflict as to whether an instrument may be probated as a holographic will if printed
matter in it can be ignored without destroying the sense of the instrument, see ATKINSON, supra note 1 at 357-359.
5
In re Irvine's Estate, 114 Mont. 577, 139 P.2d 489 (1943) held that statement of the
month and year, without the day, is sufficient dating. Estate of French, 137 Mont. 228,
351 P.2d 548 (1960) held that statement only of the year is insufficient.
5
The U.P.C., § 2-503 (1969) will leave open to litigation the question of whether
a decedent intended a particular writing as his will. Some Montana cases have
denied probate for lack of the required intent. Estate of French, 137 Mont. 228,
351 P.2d 548 (1960); In re Hanson's Estate, 126 Mont. 522, 254 P.2d 1073 (1953);
In re Watts' Estate, 117 Mont. 505, 160 P.2d 432 (1945); In re Augestad's Estate,
111 Mont. 138, 106 P.2d 1087 (1940); In re Noyes' Estate, supra, note 4. In
the Watts' case, the court said, apparently quoting 1 ALEXANDER ON WILLS, §§ 46-47,
".. . if the maker of an instrument did not intend by that particular paper to dispose of his property . . . such instrument must be denied probate . . . no matter
how clearly it may conform to the intentions of the maker. . . ." Other Montana
decisions appear to be inconsistent with this principle. In re Van Voast's Estate, 127
Mont.
266 P.2d 377
(1954); Marney
v. Hayes,
11 Mont. 571, 29 P. 282 (1892).
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him, while alive, to settle propriety of the execution. U.P.C. 2-504 does
not prevent contest on grounds other than lack of proper execution.
Under U.P.C. 2-504, a will can be self-proved by acknowledgment
by the testator and affidavits of the witnesses made before a notary
public. U.P.C. 2-504 states the form and contents which must, in substance, be used. It is similar to a typical attestation clause and recites
that the various requirements of the statute have been met. Curiously,
the suggested form recites that the witnesses signed in the presence
and hearing of the testator, although U.P.C. 2-502, on execution of
wills, does not expressly require such signing.
U.P.C. 2-505.

WHO

R.C.M. equivalent:

MAY WITNESS.

91-113, 91-114.

U.P.C. 2-505 completely liberalizes the law as to witnesses to wills.
Under U.P.C. 2-505(a), any person generally competent to be a witness
may witness a will, and under 2-505(b) the fact that a devisee is a
witness does not invalidate any part of the will. R.C.M. 91-113 invalidates
a testamentary gift to an interested witness unless there are two other
competent witnesses. R.C.MN. 91-114, however, allows an interested witness to take the lesser of the testamentary gift to him or what he
would receive if the will were not established.
U.P.C. 2-506.

CHOICE OF LAW AS TO EXECUTION.

R.C.M. equivalent:

91-115, 91-116.

These sections are designed to allow probate in Montana of wills
which were properly executed under foreign law but not under the
law of Montana. U.P.C. 2-506 is generally similar to R.C.M. 91-115 and
91-116, but may be broader, as it would validate a will executed, in
another state and according to the law of that state, by a person then
domiciled in Montana; that may not be the effect of R.C.M. 91-116.
U.P.C. 2-507.

REVOCATION BY WRITING OR BY ACT.

R.C.M. equivalent:

91-122, 91-125.

U.P.C. 2-507 is generally similar to R.C.M. 91-122. U.P.C. 2-507
does, however, seem to say that part of a will can be revoked by inconsistency. Under R.C.M. 91-122, it is reasonably clear that part of a will
can be revoked by a later instrument expressing intent to revoke that
part of a prior will or by an act directed to that part. R.C.M. 91-115,
however, does not indicate clearly whether there can be partial revocation by inconsistency; its language suggests that a later will which is
only partly inconsistent with a prior will does not revoke any part of
the prior will but merely supersedes it in part, so long as the later
will itself is not subsequently revoked.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss1/1
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U.P.C. 2-507 does not contain a provision like that in R.C.M. 91-122
which indicates that a will can be revoked, in addition to revocation
by a written will, by an ".

. other writing of a testator, declaring

such revocation or alteration, and executed with the same formalities
with which a will should be executed by such testator. . .

."

This pro-

vision of R.C.M. 91-122 may be intended to avoid litigation as to
whether a subsequent instrument is a will if it purports to do nothing
but revoke an existing will.
U.P.C. 2-507, unlike R.C.M. 91-122, does not exclude revocation
by means not expressly provided by statute. However, U.P.C. 2-508
covers this point.
U.P.C. 2-508.

REVOCATION BY DIVORCE; NO REVOCATION BY OTHER CHANGES

OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

R.C.M. equivalent:

None.

U.P.C. 2-508 provides that a later divorce or annulment, but not a
decree of separation, revokes any provision making a devise or appointment in favor of the former spouse, any provision giving the former
spouse a power of appointment, and any nomination of the former spouse
as executor, trustee, conservator or guardian, unless the will, in which
the provision or nomination was made, provides otherwise. The will
then takes effect as if the former spouse had failed to survive the
decedent. Remarriage of the decedent and the former spouse revives
provisions and nominations revoked by this provision.
U.P.C. 2-508 proyides that no other change of circumstance revokes

a will. Because of this provision, U.P.C. 2-508 is inconsistent with
R.C.M. 91-127, 91-128, 91-129, and perhaps 91-133, which deal with revocation by marriage, marriage and the birth of issue, or a conveyance;
if the U.P.C. is adopted, presumably those provisions will be repealed.
U.P.C. 2-508 may also render R.C.M. 91-130, 91-131, and 91-132 unnecessary or require modification of them.
U.P.C. 2-508 does not mention property settlements and therefore
presumably does not depend on the making of a property settlement.

U.P.C. 2-204, however, among other things does provide that a property
settlement made after or in anticipation of a separation or divorce is a

renunciation of benefits that would have otherwise passed from the
other spouse by virtue of the provisions of a will made before the property settlement.
U.P.C. 2-509.

REVIVAL OF REVOKED

R.C.M. equivalent:

WILL.

91-126.

U.P.C. 2-509(a) is roughly similar to R.C.M. 91-126 in providing
that, if a testator makes a will, later executes a second will which
revokes the first will, and still later revokes the second will, the first
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1974
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will does not automatically revive. Both U.P.C. 2-509(a) and R.C.M.
91-126 do treat the first will as revived, under some circumstances.
R.C.M. 91-126 treats the first will as revived only if ". . . it appears
by the terms of such revocation . . ." of the second will that the testator
intended to revive the first will or if the testator republishes the first
will. Presumably, republication of the first will would make it effective,
regardless of R.C.M. 91-126, so the critical provision here relates to a
finding of intent to revive from ". . . the terms of such revocation. .. ."
The quoted phrase seems to refer to the terms of a written instrument
which revokes the second will. Presumably, therefore, oral declarations
of intent to revive the first will would be insufficient to satisfy R.C.M.
91-126.
U.P.C. 2-509(a) is more liberal than R.C.M. 91-126 as to evidence
of intent to revive. It permits a finding of such intent from the circumstances of a revocation or a testator's contemporary or subsequent
declarations. Perhaps this liberality is explicable by the fact that a
testator's oral declarations are admissible as to his intent to revoke a
second will, if he revoked it by an act ;7 his oral statement showing
intent to revoke a second will may likely, as a matter of fact, also show
his intent to revive a first will.
U.P.C. 2-509(b), like R.C.M. 91-126, leaves a first will revoked if
a second, revoking will is revoked by a third will, except to the extent
the terms of the third will show intent that the first will be effective.
U.P.C. 2-509(a), curiously, speaks of a second will ". . . which, had
it remained effective at death, would have revoked the first will. .. ."
This may imply that a subsequent will revokes a prior will only at the
death of the testator. Probably the draftsman did not intend this implication. If a revoking will does not revoke a prior will unless and until
the testator dies without revoking the revoking will, there seems to be
no need for a provision dealing with revival of a first will on revocation
of a second, revoking will.8

U.P.C. 2-510.

INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE.

R.C.M. equivalent:

None.

U.P.C. 2-510 states the common law doctrine that a will may incorporate by reference an existing document, if the will sufficiently
identifies the other document and shows intent to incorporate it.9 Montana appears to have no statute adopting this doctrine, except to the
7

at 441-442.
There seems to be a conflict as to when revocation by a later instrument is effective.
2 BOWES-PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS, § 21.49 et. seq. (1960). It appears, however, that
under a statute like REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 91-126 (1947), courts are likely
to hold that revocation by a later instrument is effective on execution of the later
instrument. 2 BOWES-PARKER, supra at § 21.55, note 8.
ATKINSON, supra note 3 at 385 et. seq.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss1/1
ATKINSON, supra note 3
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limited extent it is codified by the pour-over statute, R.C.M. 91-321,
which is discussed below.
U.P.C. 2-511.

TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS.

R.C.M. equivalent:

91-321.

U.P.C. 2-511 is a pour-over provision similar to R.C.M. 91-321 but
somewhat more inclusive. R.C.M. 91-321 seems to permit a pour-over
only to a trust which has been "created" and "established" before or
concurrently with execution of the testator's will. Presumably this requires that the trust have some corpus, even though R.C.M. 91-321
makes clear that the trustee's interest in an insurance policy which
remains subject to change of beneficiaries by the settlor is a sufficient
corpus. U.P.C. 2-511, however, requires only that the recipient trust
be ". . . established or to be established" and that its terms be set forth
in a writing, other than a will, executed before or concurrently with
the execution of the testator's will or in the valid last will of a person
who has predeceased the testator. U.P.C. 2-511 expressly indicates that
a pour-over can be effective regardless of the existence of the corpus
of the recipient trust.
U.P.C. 2-511 seems somewhat more inclusive than R.C.M. 91-321 in
respect to the effect of amendments to the recipient trust. R.C.M.
91-321 permits administration of the poured-over property in accordance
with amendments to the recipient trust made before or after execution
of the testator's will but before his death. U.P.C. 2-511 permits administration in accordance also with amendments made to the recipient trust
after the testator's death, if his will so provides. Thus, U.P.C. 2-511
permits greater flexibility in administration, to meet changing conditions.
U.P.C. 2-512.

EVENTS OF INDEPENDENT

R.C.M. equivalent:

SIGNIFICANCE.

None.

U.P.C. 2-512 codifies the common law rule which allows a will to
be construed by reference to an act which has significance independent
of the will. 10 Under that doctrine, a testator may make a bequest to
"persons who shall be my partners at the time of my death." Stubbs v.
Sargon, 3 My & Cr 507, 40 Eng. Rep. 1022 (1838). That doctrine does
not appear in the statutes of Montana, except to a limited extent in
R.C.M. 91-321, the pour-over statute.
U.P.C. 2-513.

SEPARATE WRITING IDENTIFYING REQUEST OF TANGIBLE PROP-

ERTY.

R.C.M. equivalent:

None.

U.P.C. 2-513 allows a testator to dispose informally of nonbusiness
tangible personalty, such as guns, cameras, fishing tackle, linens, or
"ATKINSON,
supra note at
3 University
supra note of
3 at
394 et. seq.
Published
by ScholarWorks
Montana,
1974
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china, without meeting the requirements of incorporation by reference
or of the doctrine relating to events of independent significance. Under
U.P.C. 2-513, the testator need only refer in his will to a written statement or list by which he will dispose of this type of property and then
make the statement or list in his own handwriting or in a writing signed
by him. The statement or list need not exist at the time of execution
of the will and need have no purpose other than disposing of the listed
property. It may be altered after its preparation."
U.P.C. 2-601.

REQUIREMENT THAT DEVISEE SURVIVE TESTATOR BY

R.C.M. equivalent:

None:

120

HOURS.

Compare R.C.M. 91-423 through 91-430.

Under U.P.C. 2-601, a devisee who does not survive a testator by 120
hours is treated as if he had died before the testator, unless the testator
has made some other provision dealing with the problem. The approach
of the U.P.C. here is similar to that adopted as to intestacy in U.P.C.
2-104. This is a broader approach than that of the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act, R.C.M. 91-423 through 91-430, which applies only if there
is insufficient evidence that persons died other than simultaneously.
U.P.C. 2-601 seems preferable, as it would save expense and possible
passage of property to unintended persons in cases in which a devisee
survives but not long enough to enjoy his devise.
U.P.C. 2-602.

CHOICE OF LAW AS TO MEANING AND EFFECT OF WILLS.

R.C.M. equivalent:

None:

Compare 91-319.

This provision allows a testator to name a state the law of which
will govern the meaning and effect of his will, unless that law is contary to the public policy of Montana. This provision may be useful either
if the law of Montana would produce a result a testator does not like
or if the law of Montana is unknown, for lack of a clear statute or
judicial precedent. It may be useful also if a testator owns land in a
state other than his domicile and wants the same law to apply to all
of his property.
R.C.M. 91-319 merely states the usual rule that the law of the domicile governs as to personalty and the law of the location as to land.

U.P.C. 2-603.

RULES OF CNSTRUCTION AND INTENTION.

R.C.M. equivalent:

91-201.

U.P.C. 2-603 probably was intended merely to state the usual rule
that the intention of a testator governs the construction of his will,
as far as possible. That is the effect of R.C.M. 91-201. U.P.C. 2-603
lThis provision departs from common law. ATK NsoN, supra note 3 at 396, note 14.
It is a concession to the common desire of lay testators for flexibility in dealing
with personal effects.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss1/1
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says, however, that, "The intention of a testator as expressed in his
will controls the legal effect of his dispositions. . . ." Taken literally,
this might allow a testator to provide, effectively, that the Rule against
Perpetuities shall not apply to his dispositions; that is probably not
the draftsman's intention.
U.P.C. 2-604.

CONSTRUCTION

THAT WILL PASSES ALL PROPERTY; AFTER-AC-

QUIRED PROPERTY.

R.C.M. equivalent:

91-141.

Under U.P.C. 2-604, a will normally passes all property a testator
owns at death, including property acquired after execution of his will.
Like R.C.M. 91-141, U.P.C. 2-604 replaces a contrary common law rule
as to land.
U.P.C. 2-605.

ANTI-LAPSE; DECEASED DEVISEE; CLASS GIFTS.

R.C.M. equivalent:

91-139, 91-227.

U.P.C. 2-605, taken with U.P.C. 2-601, limits its anti-lapse provisions
to a group narrower than that covered by R.C.M. 91-139. R.C.'I. 91-139
applies to devises or bequests to any ". . . child, or other relation ...
"
U.P.C. 2-605 applies only to devises to a testator's grandparents or their
lineal descendants.
U.P.C. 2-605 and R.C.M. 91-139 are similar in that both pass property to issue of a devisee and are ineffective if a devisee leaves no lineal
descendants. U.P.C. 2-605 benefits only those issue of a devisee who
survive a testator by 120 hours. R.C.M. 91-139 speaks of a devisee or
legatee who "... dies before the testator, leaving lineal descendants ..
without specifying whether the lineal descendants of a devisee must
survive the testator to take.
U.P.C. 2-605 provides expressly that it applies to class gifts regardless of whether a potential member of a class dies before or after execution of a will. R.C.M. 91-139 leaves the question of applicability to
class gifts open.
Incidentally, the annotations to R.C.M. 91-139, which state that
it applies only to devises, are based on old cases and are misleading.
That section now clearly applies to both bequests and devises.
U.P.C. 2-206. FAILURE OF TESTAMENTARY PROVISION.
R.C.M. equivalent:

91-126 and 91-127.

Under U.P.C. 2-606(a) if a devise other than a residuary devise
fails, the property devised falls into the residue. Although R.C.M. 91-126
and 91-127 state that all property not otherwise effectually devised or
bequeathed passes under a residuary clause and thus are somewhat
broader than U.P.C. 2-60 6 (a), they do cover the problem dealt with by it.
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1974
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U.P.C. 2-606 provides that, if a devise to one of two or more residuary devisees fails, his share passes to the other residuary devisees,
if 2-605 doesn't apply. This section settles a conflict which exists in the
absence of such a statute, and probably settles it as a testator would
12
prefer.

U.P.C. 2-607.

CHANGE IN SECURITIES; ACCESSIONS; NONADEMPTION.

R.C.M. equivalent:

None.

U.P.C. 2-607 provides that the intended devisee of a specific devise
of securities receives only so much of the securities as the testator owns
when he dies, plus stock dividends, apparently; securities of other entities received through changes in corporate form; and additional securities received through reinvestment in regulated investment companies. Cash dividends distributed prior to death would not pass to the
devisee.

U.P.C. 2-608.

NONADEMPTION OF SPECIFIC DEVISES IN CERTAIN CASES; SALE BY

CONSERVATOR; UNPAID PROCEEDS OF SALE, CONDEMNATION OR INSURANCE.

R.C.M. equivalent:

None.

U.P.C. 2-608(a) provides that a devisee of specifically devised property receives the net proceeds of the devised property if a conservator has
sold the property or received a condemnation award or the proceeds of insurance, unless there is an adjudication that the testator's disability has
ceased and he has survived that adjudication by one year.
U.P.C. 2-608(b) provides that a specific devisee receives any balance
due a testator on the price of property he sold, plus any security interest
of the testator; any unpaid amount of a condemnation award; any
proceeds unpaid on fire or casualty insurance on the property; and property owned by the testator as a result of foreclosure or in lieu of foreclosure of security for a specifically devised obligation.
In the situations dealt with by U.P.C. 2-608, the common law would
typically hold that the devisee gets nothing, although there are contrary
holdings in some situations. U.P.C. 2-608 seems better designed to
effectuate the probable preference of testators, without the necessity
of distorting a specific devise into a demonstrative devise.

U.P.C. 2-609.

NON-EXONERATION.

R.C.M. equivalent:

91-131.

Under U.P.C. 2-609, specifically devised property remains subject
to security interests, without exoneration, regardless of a general direction to pay debts. This may also be the effect of R.C.M. 91-131, al1ATKINSON, supra note 3 at 784-785.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss1/1
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though the primary purpose of that section may be to provide that
encumbering property does not revoke a testamentary gift of it. The
general common law rule, contrary to U.P.C. 2-609, called for exoneration.
U.P.C. 2-610.

EXERCISE OF POVER OF APPOINTMENT.

R.C.M. equivalent:

91-214 through 91-217.

U.P.C. 2-610 provides that a general residuary clause or a disposition
of all of a testator's property does not impliedly exercise powers of
appointment; for an exercise to occur, there must be a specific reference
to the power or some other indication of intent to exercise the power.
This reverses what appears to be the rule of R.C.M. 91-214 through
13
91-217 and reverts to the usual common law rule.
This provision is desirable in view of section 2056(b) (5) of the
Internal Revenue Code, which encourages testamentary gifts with general testamentary powers of appointment as devices for qualifying for
the federal estate tax marital deduction. U.P.C. 2-610 would prevent
inadvertent exercise by a surviving spouse, in a case in which the draftsman of the will creating the power did not require express exercise.

U.P.C. 2-611.

CONSTRUCTION OF GENERIC TERMS TO ACCORD WITH RELATION-

SHIPS AS DEFINED FOR INTESTATE SUCCESSION.

R.C.M. equivalents:

67-212, 91-404, 91-405, and 91-411.

U.P.C. 2-611 provides that testamentary gifts to classes shall be
construed, in respect to half-bloods, adopted persons, and illegitimates,
in accordance with the rules governing intestacy, except that an illegitimate will not be treated as the child of its father unless the father
openly and notoriously treated him as his child. As to illegitimates, this
provision may not be so broad as R.C.M. 91-404, under which a father
can make his illegitimate child his own heir by a written acknowledgment, without more. R.C.M. 91-404 on its face is not clear as to what is
needed for an illegitimate to inherit through his father; it seems to
suggest that there must be both marriage of the child's parents and
acknowledgment of the child or adoption of him into the family.
U.P.C. 2-611 and 2-107, taken together, indicate that half-blood
relatives would share testamentary gifts to classes with whole-blood
relatives.
U.P.C. 2-612.

ADEMPTION BY SATISFACTION.

R.C.M. equivalent:

91-235 and 91-311.

U.P.C. 2-612 provides against ademption by satisfaction in the absence of provision in a will for it, contemporaneous written declaration
13L. SIMEs,
HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FUTURE
INTEIESTS,
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by the testator, or written acknowledgment by the devisee, The effect
of R.C.M. 91-235 appears similar, except that it does not refer to acknowledgment by the devisee. U.P.C. 2-612 and 2-110 separate the concepts
of advancement and ademption by satisfaction, which R.C.M. 91-235
scrambles.
U.P.C. 2-612 also provides that the property given inter vivos is
valued when the donee gets possession. or enjoyment or when the donor
dies, whichever occurs first.
U.P.C. 2-701.

CONTRACTS CONCERNING SUCCESSION.

R.C.M. equivalent.

None.

U.P.C. 2-701 does not allow proof of a contract to make or not to
revoke a will unless a will states the material provisions of the contract,
or a will refers expressly to the contract and extrinsic evidence proves
its terms, or a writing signed by the decedent evidences the contract.
Under U.P.C. 2-701 execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not
create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills.
U.P.C. 2-801.

RENUNCIATION OF SUCCESSION.

R.C.M. equivalent:

None.

U.P.C. 2-801 permits an heir, devisee, appointee under a power of
appointment, beneficiary, or a successor to a renounced interest to renounce his interest. It also states the mechanics for making a renunciation and a period within which it must be made.
The purpose of this section is primarily to allow an heir the same
freedom to renounce that a devisee has. It has been thought that an
heir cannot renounce, so that he takes title regardless of his intent and
makes a gift to another if he tries to renounce. 14 Thus, the heir may
incur liability for the federal gift tax. Also, there may be a question
of whether the approach of Hardenburgh creates difficulty in using disclaimers in post-death planning related to the marital deduction. 15 Thus,
U.P.C. 2-801 should facilitate post-death revision of testate and intestate
dispositions of property without bad tax results.
U.P.C. 2-802.

EFFECT OF DIVORCE, ANNULMENT,

R.C.M. equivalent:

AND DECREE OF SEPARATION.

None.

U.P.C. 2-802 provides that a person who is divorced from a decedent or whose marriage to a decedent was annulled is not the decedent's surviving spouse. A mere decree of separation is not a divorce
"Hardenburgh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 836
(1952).

lESee

1 CCH FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REPORTER, § 2101.03, which states that

a disclaimer must be valid refusal under
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss1/1

state law.

12

tion 5 Through 9 Of The Uniform Probate And The Revised Codes Of Montana: Principally The Execution,
1974]
EXECUTION, REVOCATION, & CONST. OF WILLS
13
for the purpose of this section. Most significantly, U.P.C. 2-802 treats
a person as divorced if he obtains or consents to a decree, regardless of
whether the decree is valid in Montana. Although the drafting is not
clear, U.P.C. 2-802 appears to have been intended to give this same effect
to an invalid decree obtained by the decedent, if the person in question
participates in a marriage ceremony with a third person after the decree.
Under U.P.C. 2-802, a person who was a party to a valid decree of
separation with an order purporting to terminate all marital property
rights is not a surviving spouse.
U.P.C. 2-802 is expressly incorporated by reference into U.P.C. 2-508,
which provides for revocation by divorce, and should be read also in
conjunction with U.P.C. 2-204, which deals with waiver of rights by a
surviving spouse.

U.P.C. 2-803.
ASSETS,

EFFECT OF HOMICIDE ON INTESTATE SUCCESSION,

WILLS, JOINT

LIFE INSURANCE AND BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS.

R.C.M. equivalent:

None.

U.P.C. 2-803 provides that a surviving spouse, heir, devisee, beneficiary of insurance, or appointee who feloniously and intentionally kills
a decedent shall not take any benefits. The property passes as if the
killer had predeceased the decedent. In the case of a joint tenancy, the
killing severs the joint tenancy so that the decedent's share passes as
his property and the killer has no rights by survivorship; apparently
the killer retains his own share. Montana cases suggest that the killer
may retain his own share.
U.P.C. 2-803 provides that a conviction of felonious and intentional
killing is conclusive and that in the absence of a conviction, the court
may decide by a preponderance of evidence whether the killing was,
felonious and intentional. Presumably, the civil court may also decide,
in the absence of a conviction, whether there was a killing by the person
in question.
U.P.C. 2-803 protects bona fide purchasers, insurance companies,
and banks which have acted without notice of a claim based on its
provisions.

U.P.C. 2-901.

DEPOSIT OF WILL WITH COURT IN TESTATOR'S LIFETIME.

R.C.M. equivalent:

None.

U.P.C. 2-901 provide for confidential deposit of wills of living persons with a court for safekeeping. This is designed to enable a testator
to avoid the possibility that his will may be lost or accidentally destroyed,
with the difficulties that arise in using provisions like those n R.C.M.
91-1201
91-1204.
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DUTY OF CUSTODIAN OF WILLS; LIABILITY.

R.C.M. equivalent:

91-801.

U.P.C. 2-902 requires a person
it on the death of the testator. If
for damages and may be subjected
if he disobeys an order to deliver

with custody of a will to produce
he fails to do so, he may be liable
to a penalty for contempt of court,
the will.

The effect of U.P.C. 2-902 is similar to that of R.C.M. 91-801, but
not quite the same. U.P.C. 2-902 requires delivery to a person able to
procure probate or, if none is known, to a court; R.C.M. 91-801 requires
delivery to a court or to the executor named in the will. R.C.M. 91-801
does not mention liability of the custodian for a penalty for contempt of
court, although presumably such liability is possible.
CONCLUSION
The U.P.C. benefits both the lawyer and the public. For example,
because such open questions as the effect of the anti-lapse statute on
class gifts are settled, the lawyer will be better able to predict the
results of his drafting or potential litigation. Furthermore, the lawyer
may continue to use all of the formal ceremony he thinks appropriate
to the execution of wills and may also take advantage of the additional
machinery provided by the U.P.C. concerning self-proved wills.
The advantages are twofold. For the lawyer, the U.P.C. should
minimize the chances that his mistakes or omissions will frustrate the
intentions of a testator. As a consequence, there will be less exposure
to charges of malpractice and less public dissatisfaction with lawyers.
For the public, the U.P.C. can result in considerable savings of time
and money in the handling of decedents' estates.
The U.P.C. does not attack present problems piecemeal. Rather, it
is a new concept, complete in itself. The result of the U.P.C. is to make
the entire law of wills and estates more responsive to the needs of the
public. Therefore, the writer believes that the U.P.C. should be enacted
as it is drafted. To tinker with the drafting at this point could only
serve to reduce the benefit that the public stands to realize from the
1
enactment of the U.P.C. 6

'6 Sikora v. Sikora, ......
Mont .......
499 P.2d 809, 910 (1972); In re Cox' Estate, 141
Mont. 583, 380 P.2d 584, 585 (1963). For additional material, the reader should see
the bibliography given by Professor Wellman at the conclusion of his article, Law

Teachers and the Uniform Probate Code, reprinted from 24 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION

180 and available from West Publishing Company. Both forms and explana-

tory text are available also in the Uniform

'robate Code Practice Manual. published

by the Association of Continuing Legal Education Administrators and printed by New
Jersey Appellate Printing Co., Inc., 399 Pearl Street, Woodbridge, New Jersey 07095.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss1/1

14

